ILLICIT HUB MAPPING IN WEST AFRICA
2025 | PRESS KIT

West Africa is a region marked by profound economic dynamism but persistent insecurity. Non-state armed groups are key drivers of violence across the region. According to the findings of the Global Terrorism Index 2025, the Sahel now accounts for 51% of worldwide terrorism deaths.
Illicit economies underpin conflict dynamics across the region, serving as a central pillar of the war economies in the most violent conflicts. Illicit economies also operate as key drivers of conflict and violence. Complicating the response, some illicit economies are also key regional livelihoods.
Armed groups – whether violent extremist organizations, criminal groups or insurgents – exploit a range of illicit economies, from arms trafficking and the illicit trade in fuel and motorbikes, to cattle rustling, kidnapping, extortion and the illegal gold trade.
Their objectives? To obtain crucial operational resources, to finance their operations and even to gain legitimacy in the eyes of local populations.
New research by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime provides an updated mapping of the major hubs of illicit economies in West Africa and parts of Central Africa, focusing on the nexus between organized crime and conflict and instability in the region.
✽ This 2025 mapping updates a 2022 mapping exercise, enabling analysis of key trends over time.
Key findings:
1. In one in five illicit hubs across the region (70 out of the 350 identified), illicit economies play a significant role as vectors of conflict, violence and instability.
2. Five illicit markets have the strongest links to instability: extortion and protection racketeering, arms trafficking, cattle rustling, kidnapping and the illicit gold trade.
3. Extortion and protection racketeering is prominent (54%) in hubs that play a significant role in fuelling instability and those providing finance, resources and legitimacy to armed groups.
4. The synthetic drug trade is the most pervasive illicit economy across the region and is spreading fast. Of most concern are synthetic opioids, including tramadol and ‘kush’, a synthetic drug often found to include nitazenes.
5. Illicit economies are a major funding source for armed non-state actors, including violent extremist groups. Armed groups also exploit illicit economies to obtain operational resources and to build legitimacy.
6. Arms trafficking is the most common form of illicit activity in hubs most strongly linked to instability in the region. However, changes in the region’s conflict landscape have resulted in a shift in arms trafficking routes, for example as a result of increased fighting in northern Mali that has disrupted long-standing trafficking routes from Libya, and the war in Sudan that is driving proliferation of increasingly sophisticated weapons into Chad.






Three types of illicit hubs
The mapping identifies three types of illicit hubs

Hotspots
Places where there is a strong presence of illicit economies and organized criminal activities as well as criminal actors. In hotspots, there is either the ‘production’ or ‘distribution’ of illicit activity, or both. Such hotspots of illicit activity feed into wider national or regional criminal dynamics.
Transit points
Specific pivotal locations such as seaports, airports, border crossings and road infrastructure that are leveraged for the trafficking of illicit commodities.
Illicit ecosystems
Referred to as ‘crime zones’ in the 2022 mapping, illicit ecosystems are areas that bind together several interlinked hotspots or transit points, with the illicit economies operating there being closely intertwined.
Accelerant markets: drivers of instability
Crime and conflict are widely recognized as being linked. However, some illicit economies play a far more important role in fuelling instability than others. In West Africa, these include the illicit arms trade, cattle rustling, kidnapping, the illicit gold trade, extortion and protection racketeering.
Armed groups engage with illicit economies for three main goals: revenue generation; obtaining operational resources (such as fuel, vehicles or motorbikes); and building legitimacy among the communities in which they operate. The mapping project found that hubs that play a significant role in enabling armed groups to achieve any of these goals are also almost exclusively those that play the most significant role in driving instability across the region more broadly.
Prevalence of illicit economies in hubs with ‘low’ and ‘high’/‘very high’ IEIM scores.
Prevalence of illicit economies in hubs with ‘low’ and ‘high’/‘very high’ IEIM scores.

Illicit arms trade
The illicit arms trade fuels violence across the region, weaponizing conflicts, supplying key non-state conflict actors and increasing violence as a vehicle for criminal market control. As armed groups expand their reach, guns move faster and farther, arming fighters and frightened local communities alike.

Cattle rustling
Once a rural crime, now a war economy. Armed groups loot herds, impose ‘taxes’ and sell stolen cattle across borders – especially between Burkina Faso, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire – turning livestock into both cash and control.

Kidnapping
Kidnapping has exploded into a regional industry, blurring the line between crime and warfare. Across the region, violent extremist organizations and other armed groups treat abduction as both revenue and retribution – a tool to fund their campaigns and to tighten their grip on communities. With cases up sharply in recent years, kidnapping has become one of the most visible – and terrifying – signs of West Africa’s deepening insecurity.

Extortion and protection racketeering
From violent extremist organizations taxing herders to bandits charging ‘fees', extortion has become a shadow form of governance. It binds communities to armed actors and entrenches parallel authority.

Illicit gold trade
Gold bankrolls fighters and sustains miners. Across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, gold sites double as hubs for weapons and drug flows — making the metal both a livelihood and a driver of instability.
Key shifts in crime–conflict dynamics:
Compared to the 2022 baseline report, it is possible to identify shifts in crime–conflict dynamics. These include:
✽ Growing evidence of how the tri-border region between Burkina Faso, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire is a resourcing hub for the violent extremist group Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).
✽ Stronger links between Illicit hubs in northern Benin and conflicts in the Sahel, including an increase in cattle rustling and kidnapping, that fuel instability.
✽ The entrenchment of JNIM in north and eastern Burkina Faso is further embedding the group in illicit economies, including the growing control over roads, which generate resources to support operations and governance.
✽ Resurgence of conflict in northern Mali that has disrupted illicit economies, including the arms trade and the migrant smuggling economy, and weakened resource flows to non-armed state groups, particularly revenue generated from the gold sector.
✽ In north-east Nigeria, the growing influence of Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS), which has captured territory from Islamic State West Africa Province, has significant implications for communities: JAS uses far more violent tactics.




Tri-border trouble
One example is how the tri-border area between Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana has become an increasingly important illicit hub for JNIM.
The JNIM unit active in the tri-border area – the Katiba Banfora – has shifted its focus to financing and resourcing rather than expanding the group’s operations after a major military crackdown by Côte d’Ivoire following a deadly attack on its soldiers by JNIM in 2020.
Cross-border smuggling critical to JNIM’s resourcing includes fuel and motorbikes, which are imported through coastal ports, especially in Ghana, and trafficked northwards.
The tri-border area also plays an important role in JNIM financing: thousands of heads of livestock, stolen in conflict hotspots in central Mali or northern Burkina Faso, are transported through this area to be sold at markets in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana by intermediaries.
JNIM has also drawn resources from artisanal gold mining activity in the Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire parts of the tri-border area.
Stolen livestock routes and selling points in the Burkina Faso–Ghana–Côte d’Ivoire tri-border area
Looking forward
There are warning signs that armed groups in the Sahel are adapting their behaviour, seeking new opportunities, and expanding their operational and geographic reach.
For example, since the beginning of 2025, both Islamic State Sahel Province and JNIM have significantly increased their reliance on kidnapping for ransom as a financing stream. Watch for this to continue.
Increased kidnappings and attacks on companies could be part of JNIM's tactic of deploying economic warfare in southern Mali. Kayes, a gold-rich area in south-western Mali, is vulnerable to JNIM's exploitation of the gold sector. Kidnappings for ransom targeting Chinese artisanal gold miners could become one of the group’s approaches for generating revenue.
Sustained escalation of violence in southern Mali could drive heightened movement on smuggling of migrants on maritime routes from Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau to the Canary Islands.
Recommendations – What can be done?
✽ Formalize and support the artisanal gold mining sector, and avoid prohibitions and crackdowns.
✽ Prioritize responses to cattle rustling, including by strengthening regulation of the livestock sector.
✽ Understand and address non-financial motivations behind kidnappings by armed groups, particularly the perception of community members serving as state informants.
✽ Strengthen weapons management systems and regulation of arms control exports.
✽ Improve information systems to stem the rapid spread of synthetic drugs.
✽ Strengthen support for communities near national parks that are vulnerable to infiltration by armed groups.
About the project
This research is delivered by the GI-TOC as part of the ‘Support to the Mitigation of Destabilizing Effects of Transnational Organised Crime (M-TOC)’. The M-TOC project is an ECOWAS project commissioned by the German Federal Foreign Office, implemented by Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, and the GI-TOC, from 2024 to 2025. The project aims to map regional illicit markets in West Africa in order to improve the evidence base for stabilization and peacebuilding interventions, and to strengthen the engagement of civil society and state actors in the fight against criminal markets.
About the West Africa Observatory
The GI-TOC's Observatory of Illicit Economies in West Africa, established in 2021, encompasses researchers working across wider West Africa and the Sahel. The observatory works to shed light on the political economy of transnational organized crime in the region, focusing on the links between illicit markets, instability and conflict. The observatory applies a partnership approach, working with and supporting civil society across the region. As part of this, the observatory maps the hubs, routes and flows of illicit markets, and the key actors, assessing their implications for regional stability, conflict, governance and social tension in the region. The countries falling within the scope of the observatory are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.
About the GI-TOC
The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime is a network of professionals working on the front lines of the fight against the illicit economy and criminal actors. Through a network of global civil society observatories on the illicit economy, we monitor evolving trends and work to build the evidence basis for policy action, disseminate the expertise of our Network, and catalyze multisectoral and holistic responses across a range of crime types. With the Global Initiative's Resilience Fund, we support community activists and local non-governmental organizations working in areas where crime governance critically undermines people's safety, security and life chances.