FENTANYL AND SYNTHETIC DRUGS MONITOR
ISSUE 1 | OCTOBER 2026
Manufacture
and contaminants
in Canada, US
and Mexico
FENTANYL AND SYNTHETIC DRUGS MONITOR
ISSUE 1 | OCTOBER 2026
Manufacture
and contaminants
in Canada, US and Mexico
Contents
About the Fentanyl and Synthetic Drugs Monitor
In this issue
Methodology
An explanatory note on fentanyl and other synthetic opioids
Beneath the headline numbers
Key finding 1
Fentanyl manufactured in the unregulated market is available in the US, Canada and Mexico, but synthetic drugs for veterinary use, or without any medical use, have been detected mostly in Canada and the US
Key finding 2
Contrary to conventional wisdom, enforcement operations by the Mexican Army during the López Obrador administration (2018–2024) were concentrated in Sinaloa
Key finding 3
Mexico’s seizure priorities largely ignore treatment demand
Key finding 4
Thirty-four years of data show drug seizures have expanded in geographic scope, but there are disparities along the US–Mexico border, depending on the substance
Key finding 5
The franchise model used by Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación severely limits the impacts of seizing clandestine labs
Key finding 6
Criminal groups sustain themselves through forced recruitment of young people
Contents
About the Fentanyl and Synthetic Drugs Monitor
In this issue
Methodology
An explanatory note on fentanyl and other synthetic opioids
Beneath the headline numbers
Key finding 1
Fentanyl manufactured in the unregulated market is available in the US, Canada and Mexico, but synthetic drugs for veterinary use, or without any medical use, have been detected mostly in Canada and the US
Key finding 2
Contrary to conventional wisdom, enforcement operations by the Mexican Army during the López Obrador administration (2018–2024) were concentrated in Sinaloa
Key finding 3
Mexico’s seizure priorities largely ignore treatment demand
Key finding 4
Thirty-four years of data show drug seizures have expanded in geographic scope, but there are disparities along the US–Mexico border, depending on the substance
Key finding 5
The franchise model used by Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación severely limits the impacts of seizing clandestine labs
Key finding 6
Criminal groups sustain themselves through forced recruitment of young people
About the Fentanyl and Synthetic Drugs Monitor
This is the first bulletin of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime’s (GI-TOC) Fentanyl and Synthetic Drugs Monitor, produced by our North America Observatory. This series of publications will build on ‘Unregulated fentanyl in North America: A trilateral perspective’, a GI-TOC report that explains how illicitly manufactured fentanyl is produced and distributed across Mexico, the US and Canada. That report examined the region’s complex and highly integrated system of production, tablet pressing, trafficking and consumption.
This monitor will track regional developments to provide a nuanced understanding of supply-side dynamics in Canada, the US and Mexico. It also covers developments in multilateral spaces that receive little media attention but are key for understanding regional drug policy cooperation.
In this issue
This first edition presents key findings from aggregated data from the US and Canada with a focus on medetomidine and bromazolam – two highly potent tranquillizing substances that are increasingly mixed with fentanyl to prolong the opioid high and stretch the supply. Both substances pose serious health risks, since they have no human medical use and have rapidly increased their presence in US and Canadian drug supplies. Notably, medetomidine and bromazolam have yet to be detected in Mexico, raising questions on supply chains and adulteration.
This edition also analyzes over three decades of data on reported counter-narcotic activities by the Mexican army, which contextualizes Mexico’s role in the manufacture and distribution of various substances present in North American drug markets over time. In doing so, it shows the production of fentanyl and other synthetic drugs does not take place in a vacuum, but follows a long trajectory of increasing expertise in drug production.
Methodology
The monitor relies on field research, interviews, analysis of data obtained from official sources, survey data from the Survey on the Quality of Mexican Democracy, media reports, the University of North Carolina Street Drug Analysis Lab, the Canadian Centre on Substance Use and Addiction, and harm reduction organizations conducting drug analysis along the US–Mexico border.
Beneath the headline numbers
While recent official reports indicate a decrease in overdose deaths in Canada and the United States, and in homicides in Mexico, the region is still beset by high levels of excess mortality. The opioid death rate in Canada, for example, stood at around 14 per 100 000 people in 2025, down from 20 per 100 000 in 2024. In the US, opioid overdose death rate decreased to 16 per 100 000 (age-adjusted) in 2024 from 24 per 100 000 in 2023. Homicides in Mexico declined from 25.8 per 100 000 in 2024 to 21.4 per 100 000 in 2025.
Equally important, however, is that – although decreases in overdoses and homicides are critical public policy outcomes – these declines are unevenly spread among various demographic groups in the region. Differences in drug overdose deaths among racial and ethnic groups are widening while overdose deaths involving multiple drugs have also increased. In 2024 in the US, for example, American Indians and Alaska Natives (AIAN) accounted for twice the opioid overdose death rate than among white people, while in Canada First Nations people died at 5.4 times the rate of other British Columbia residents between January and June 2025.
Furthermore, the presence of synthetic opioids – including those without human medical uses, such as carfentanil and nitazene – and synthetic drugs used in veterinary medicine such as medetomidine, have resulted in drug toxicity events that are increasingly complex and difficult to manage, creating challenges for evidence-based drug policies.
FIGURE 1 Opioid overdose death rate by race/ethnicity.
Source: KFF analysis of CDC WONDER multiple cause of death files, February 2026
FIGURE 2 Opioid overdose death rates and all drug overdose death rates per 100 000.
Source: KFF analysis of Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics, Underlying cause of death 1999–2024 on CDC WONDER Online Database
Note: Data is from the Multiple Cause of Death Files, 1999–2024, as compiled from data provided by the 57 vital statistics jurisdictions through the Vital Statistics Cooperative Program
FIGURE 3 Opioid- and stimulant-related harms in Canada, 2025.
Source: Government of Canada
FIGURE 4 Homicide rates in Mexico, 2025.
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI), Homicide deaths, August 2026
An explanatory note on fentanyl and other synthetic opioids
Synthetic drug markets are changing rapidly. To help the reader understand the potential lethality of synthetic opioids increasingly found in the North American drug supply, Figure 5 shows different opioid types and their potency relative to morphine.
FIGURE 5 Opioids and their relative potency to morphine.
Source: Adapted from World Health Organization and National Institutes of Health data
Whereas fentanyl is often used in the media as shorthand for synthetic opioids, data from community drug checking programmes in Canada and the US offers a more complex picture. Evidence from Canada shows users face life-threatening risks when substances found in samples do not meet user expectations.
Only 5% of fentanyl samples met user expectations in Toronto and opioids have the highest levels of adulteration compared to other drug classes checked on Vancouver Island, Canada. Owing to the high potency of newer synthetic opioids and other synthetic drugs mixed with fentanyl, Toronto’s Drug Checking Service argues that positive health outcomes (i.e. a reduction in overdose deaths) can be achieved if we think of fentanyl as the substance that is being adulterated rather than fentanyl as the adulterant.
According to the most recent data from the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 65.1% of overdose deaths in the US involved illegally made fentanyl (i.e. fentanyl or fentanyl analogues manufactured in the unregulated market except alfentanil, remifentanil and sufentanil, which have legitimate human medical use). This is similar to findings in Canada where 56% of overdose deaths involved fentanyl and 60% involved fentanyl analogues.
For additional resources on fentanyl, the reader can also consult the FAQ and Glossary (Spanish-only) developed by the GI-TOC.
Key finding 1
Fentanyl manufactured in the unregulated market is available in the US, Canada and Mexico, but synthetic drugs for veterinary use, or without any medical use, have been detected mostly in Canada and the US.
FIGURE 6 US states by census region.
The map shows the four US Census regions: Northeast, Midwest, South and West. The bar chart shows data from the UNC Street Drug Analysis Lab, a public service provided by the University of North Carolina. This lab runs an anonymous, mail-in drug checking service using gas chromatography-mass spectrometry, which is considered the gold standard for analyzing substances. The data covers the period January 2022 through to April 2026 from tens of thousands of samples collected across all four US Census regions.
The UNC Street Drug Analysis Lab tests for 90 substances, but we have selected five substances that have either received wide policy attention, like xylazine – declared an emerging threat by the White House’s Office of National Control Drug Policy in July 2023 – and contaminants most commonly found in the drug supply that pose serious risks for people who use drugs. Figure 6 breaks down detections of these substances on a regional basis (i.e. the proportion of national detections that came from each of the four US regions as defined by the US Census).
FIGURE 7 US regional share of national detections, selected substances.
Source: Adapted from data from UNC Street Drug Analysis Lab
Notably, whereas fentanyl is almost equally distributed across all four regions, its synthesis pathways differ by region with distinctive features between the Northeast and the West. Moreover, the UNC Street Drug Analysis Lab shows significant variations in detections of other synthetic drugs by region with distinct chemical signatures for the Northeast, South, and West. Xylazine and medetomidine move together in the Northeast: 43% and 62%, respectively, of all national detections of these substances came from this region. By contrast, the West has the lowest detections for these substances – only 3% and 2%, respectively – yet it has the most for carfentanil and bromazolam at 47% and 36% of all national detections. In Canada, in Vancouver Island, bromazolam was the most common benzo found in the opioid supply: it was detected in 63.6% of benzo-positive samples. By contrast, at its peak in 2025, benzodiazepine-related drugs (including bromazolam) were found in 35% of samples in Toronto’s drug checking service, with a low of 9% for the year.
The table compares the approved uses and adverse effects for bromazolam and medetomidine, two frequent contaminants that are raising alarms in the North American drug supply (Figure 8).
FIGURE 8 Approved uses and adverse effects for bromazolam and medetomidine.
Source: Adapted from US Department of Justice, Bromazolam prevalence surging across the United States driven in part by increasing detections alongside fentanyl, 2022, https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/bromazolam-prevalence-surging-across-united-states-driven-part and Medetomidine Substance Use Philly, 2026, https://www.substanceusephilly.com/medetomidine
Figures 9 and 10 show US regional detections of bromazolam and medetomidine.
FIGURE 9 Regional share of national detections: bromazolam.
Source: UNC Street Drug Lab Analysis 2026
A ‘designer’ benzodiazepine, not approved for medical use, and commonly known as ‘benzodope’ when mixed with fentanyl, bromazolam has become ubiquitous in the North American drug markets and an integral adulterant to supplies seized in Canada and the US. In Canada, the term "benzodope" generally refers to any opioid-benzodiazepine mixture, and not just bromazolam or a bromazolam-opioid mixture. Its presence indicates supplies are cut further as they move along the supply chain from the point of synthesis to the point of retail. Arguably, the use of this adulterant contributes to maintaining a stable supply from the point of view of the retailer but introduces high variability and risks for people who specifically want to use fentanyl. Hence, it is not necessarily fentanyl that in itself may lead to an overdose, but a person using benzodope inadvertently.
FIGURE 10 Regional share of national detections: medetomidine.
Source: UNC Street Drug Lab Analysis 2026
A tranquillizer approved for surgical procedures in animals, but not humans, medetomidine also has a strong presence in Canada and the US, albeit with greater geographical concentration in the latter. According to the UNC Street Drug Lab Analysis, 62% of medetomidine samples come from the Northeast and are mostly absent in the West.
This evidence of these variations in drug supplies within the US and Canada would indicate that a one-size-fits-all approach to drug policy is inapposite, and how rapidly synthetic drug markets are changing.
Data from Health Canada’s Drug Analysis Service analyzed by the Canadian Centre on Substance Use and Addiction also shows regional variations in the detection of medetomidine. British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec saw the earliest emergence of medetomidine in 2023 (see Figure 11).
FIGURE 11 Proportion of seized samples submitted to Health Canada’s DAS that contained medetomidine, by province and territory, 2023-Q1 2026.
Source: Canadian Centre on Substance Use and Addiction, Medetomidine in Canada: Emerging trends, risks and responses, June 2026
Since then, detections have increased substantially in British Columbia and Ontario but only slightly in Quebec. Importantly, whereas in 2023 medetomidine was detected primarily with both fentanyl and analogues, during the period January to March 2026 it was detected primarily with fentanyl analogues and without fentanyl. Another noteworthy development in the first quarter of this year was a jump in detections of medetomidine to nearly 10% of all samples in Saskatchewan, despite near negligible detections in this province through to the end of 2025.
Mexico’s drug checking programmes are more recent than those in Canada and the US. Interviews with managers of these initiatives, currently using infrared detection methods complemented by gas chromatography-mass spectrometry, indicate the presence of fentanyl, but not other synthetic drugs like medetomidine. This raises important policy questions about where adulteration is taking place along the supply chains. This consideration was a major focus of our report 'Unregulated fentanyl in North America', which identified co-production dynamics between the US and Mexico, and a separate manufacturing process for Canada (where most production of fentanyl and other synthetic drugs served the domestic market).
Paradoxically, in attempting to create barriers for accessing precursors needed in fentanyl production, authorities are unintentionally creating incentives for increasingly riskier substances to enter the supply. This is of particular concern with bromazolam and medetomidine, which are resistant to the opioid overdose reversal medication naloxone.
Key finding 2
Contrary to conventional wisdom, enforcement operations by the Mexican Army during the López Obrador administration (2018–2024) were concentrated in Sinaloa.
FIGURE 12 Counter-narcotic enforcement operations by the Mexican army, by presidential term (1990–2024). Source: Adapted from Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, request for information INAI 330026424002125
The slogan Abrazos no balazos (‘hugs not bullets’) – coined by former Mexican president López Obrador – has been oversimplified as a policy of tolerating criminal groups. However, three decades of data collected by Mexico’s military show enforcement heavily concentrated in Sinaloa during López Obrador’s tenure (2018–2024), compared to a wider geographic distribution under previous administrations, and particularly under his immediate predecessor, Peña Nieto.
The data suggests that counter-narcotics operations carried out by the army in Sinaloa were accompanied by an above-average distribution of social programmes. Survey data from the Perception of Democratic Quality in Mexico (ENCADE in Spanish) asked respondents nationwide if they had received any federal social support in the last 12 months. In 2024, nationally, 15.4% answered yes. By comparison, 30.5% of residents of Sinaloa answered yes. The results are even more stark if we consider that only 4% of residents of Chiapas, which ranks among the lowest-income states in Mexico, reported enrolment in a social programme of the federal government – this despite López Obrador’s campaign slogan ‘primero los pobres’ (the underprivileged come first). Equally relevant, in the state of Jalisco, another high-enforcement state, 19% or residents reported having received federal social support in the form of benefits. That is above the national average but well below the 30.5% rate in Sinaloa. This matters because it shows López Obrador’s approach would be more accurately characterized as ‘cash and bullets’ rather than ‘hugs, not bullets’.
And, in line with findings for other substances (see below), despite targeted enforcement in specific areas of Mexico, manufacture and distribution of fentanyl continue; suggesting an ongoing and strong demand for the substance. According to President Sheinbaum’s second State of the Nation Address in September 2026, between October 2024, when her tenure began, and July 2026, her administration seized 5.5 million fentanyl pills and, between September 2025 and June 2026, 0.7 tonnes of powdered fentanyl.
Key finding 2
Contrary to conventional wisdom, enforcement operations by the Mexican Army during the López Obrador administration (2018–2024) were concentrated in Sinaloa.
FIGURE 12 Counter-narcotic enforcement operations by the Mexican army, by presidential term (1990–2024). Source: Adapted from Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, request for information INAI 330026424002125
The slogan Abrazos no balazos (‘hugs not bullets’) – coined by former Mexican president López Obrador – has been oversimplified as a policy of tolerating criminal groups. However, three decades of data collected by Mexico’s military show enforcement heavily concentrated in Sinaloa during López Obrador’s tenure (2018–2024), compared to a wider geographic distribution under previous administrations, and particularly under his immediate predecessor, Peña Nieto.
The data suggests that counter-narcotics operations carried out by the army in Sinaloa were accompanied by an above-average distribution of social programmes. Survey data from the Perception of Democratic Quality in Mexico (ENCADE in Spanish) asked respondents nationwide if they had received any federal social support in the last 12 months. In 2024, nationally, 15.4% answered yes. By comparison, 30.5% of residents of Sinaloa answered yes. The results are even more stark if we consider that only 4% of residents of Chiapas, which ranks among the lowest-income states in Mexico, reported enrolment in a social programme of the federal government – this despite López Obrador’s campaign slogan ‘primero los pobres’ (the underprivileged come first). Equally relevant, in the state of Jalisco, another high-enforcement state, 19% or residents reported having received federal social support in the form of benefits. That is above the national average but well below the 30.5% rate in Sinaloa. This matters because it shows López Obrador’s approach would be more accurately characterized as ‘cash and bullets’ rather than ‘hugs, not bullets’.
And, in line with findings for other substances (see below), despite targeted enforcement in specific areas of Mexico, manufacture and distribution of fentanyl continue; suggesting an ongoing and strong demand for the substance. According to President Sheinbaum’s second State of the Nation Address in September 2026, between October 2024, when her tenure began, and July 2026, her administration seized 5.5 million fentanyl pills and, between September 2025 and June 2026, 0.7 tonnes of powdered fentanyl.
Key finding 3
Mexico’s seizure priorities largely ignore treatment demand.
At its peak in 1999, cannabis constituted 85.1% of seizures of drugs in Mexico, compared to 41.8% in 2024. Since 2010, reductions in cannabis seizures have been accompanied by increases in seizures of methamphetamine.
FIGURE 13 Seizures by drug type, Mexico, 1990–2024.
Source: Adapted from Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, request for information INAI 330026424002125
While this graph is useful for understanding where the Mexican army’s enforcement efforts in the last 34 years have been concentrated, it is most helpful in shedding light on the mismatch between desirable health outcomes and how drug policy success is measured. For example, despite the relatively low risk posed by cannabis to users in comparison to methamphetamine and synthetic opioids, Mexican authorities have continued to concentrate significant resources on cannabis interventions, guided by the fact that this drug continues to account for the most seizures by volume. To illustrate the flawed reasoning of this policy, more Mexicans today seek out treatment for methamphetamine addiction than they do for any other drug.
Among amphetamine-type stimulants, crystal methamphetamine ranks first among psychoactive substances that have the greatest impact on the health and lives of users in Mexico. Between 2013 and 2023, Mexico’s health ministry estimated meth use had increased 400% nationally.
Problematic use of this substance is linked to the development and exacerbation of mental health problems, increasing the likelihood of severe depression or anxiety disorders, as well as an increase in episodes of aggression and violence.
The high level of availability of crystal methamphetamine is evident in cities and communities throughout Mexico. The affordable price of a dose, which ranges between 75 and 100 pesos (US$4.00 and 5.50) in the Bajío region of Mexico, has remained stable since 2020, driving consumption, especially among young people and those with limited resources. However, there are reports of doses costing as little as 50 pesos (US$2.7) – or promotional packages of three doses for 150 pesos (US$8) – in cities in northern Mexico, such as Parral and Chihuahua. On the other hand, in the state of Durango, health authorities report a price of 200 pesos per dose (US$11.00), the highest retail price reported by local media.
Lightbulbs are reportedly often stolen from outside homes for use as makeshift pipes for consuming crystal meth. This increasingly prevalent phenomenon serves as an anecdotal indicator of the extent of localized crystal meth use. The shape of a lightbulb vaporizes the substance and resembles pipes specifically designed for smoking meth.
Meanwhile, the Bajío-based organization Barbies Testeadoras, a harm reduction project that has been testing substances with colorimetric chemical reagents since 2023, reports that only 4 out of 10 samples matched user expectations. Of the 108 samples they tested, 25% were adulterated, and half of all doses of 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (more commonly known as MDMA) were adulterated with methamphetamine.
FIGURE 14 Reported drug seizures by the Mexican Army, 1990–June 2024, by quantity.
Source: Adapted from Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, request for information INAI 330026424002125
Figure 14 shows descriptive statistics for reported drug seizures by the Mexican Army between January 1990 and June 2024. The data shows that the mean is dramatically higher than the median, which signals that the data is dominated by a handful of massive outlier seizures. To illustrate, seized quantities of three drugs are as follows:
- Cocaine: the median is just 0.04 kg (a few grams), while the mean is 25.26 kg. This suggests most seized quantities are very small (probably personal-use amounts or small packages), while a few large shipments (the maximum was 11 798.50 kg) account for most of the volume.
- Methamphetamine: this follows the same pattern – median 0.07 kg vs. mean 46.74 kg, and a maximum of 15 370 kg.
- Marijuana: median 6.81 kg vs. mean 372.74 kg. Here, even the typical seizure is modest, but the maximum (135 952.76 kg) is enormous.
This tells us that counting seizure events as opposed to volume produces different stories: large numbers of operations for cocaine, marijuana and methamphetamine net small amounts, but a smaller number of large seizures drive the aggregate totals.
The data for fentanyl pills, however, presents a contrasting picture to other substances. A ‘typical’ fentanyl pill seizure (the median) involves about 5 400 pills, which suggests a trafficking operation rather than personal use amounts. The average is skewed upwards by a small number of large seizures, including the maximum seizure of approximately 2.3 million pills. Seizures of fentanyl powder are even more consistent with mid-scale operations, where the median is 10.3 kilograms, which is not very different from the average of 27 kilograms.
Mexico’s mostly reactive approach towards drug policy, and in particular fentanyl, has resulted in flawed approaches that favour outputs (i.e. volumes of drugs seized), as opposed to outcomes – health policies aligned with the needs of its population, in particular meth users. In the coming years, and in the context of rapidly changing synthetic drug markets, Mexico can build on over three decades of evidence to implement a proactive trilateral policy that contributes to addressing the challenges posed by synthetic opioids in the US, Canada and the US–Mexico border region while ensuring it allocates resources to people-centred evidence-based policies.
FIGURE 15 Drug seizures in Mexico by substance, 1990–2024.
Source: Adapted from Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, request for information INAI 330026424002125
Key finding 3
Mexico’s seizure priorities largely ignore treatment demand.
At its peak in 1999, cannabis constituted 85.1% of seizures of drugs in Mexico, compared to 41.8% in 2024. Since 2010, reductions in cannabis seizures have been accompanied by increases in seizures of methamphetamine.
FIGURE 13 Seizures by drug type, Mexico, 1990–2024.
Source: Adapted from Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, request for information INAI 330026424002125
While this graph is useful for understanding where the Mexican army’s enforcement efforts in the last 34 years have been concentrated, it is most helpful in shedding light on the mismatch between desirable health outcomes and how drug policy success is measured. For example, despite the relatively low risk posed by cannabis to users in comparison to methamphetamine and synthetic opioids, Mexican authorities have continued to concentrate significant resources on cannabis interventions, guided by the fact that this drug continues to account for the most seizures by volume. To illustrate the flawed reasoning of this policy, more Mexicans today seek out treatment for methamphetamine addiction than they do for any other drug.
Among amphetamine-type stimulants, crystal methamphetamine ranks first among psychoactive substances that have the greatest impact on the health and lives of users in Mexico. Between 2013 and 2023, Mexico’s health ministry estimated meth use had increased 400% nationally.
Problematic use of this substance is linked to the development and exacerbation of mental health problems, increasing the likelihood of severe depression or anxiety disorders, as well as an increase in episodes of aggression and violence.
The high level of availability of crystal methamphetamine is evident in cities and communities throughout Mexico. The affordable price of a dose, which ranges between 75 and 100 pesos (US$4.00 and 5.50) in the Bajío region of Mexico, has remained stable since 2020, driving consumption, especially among young people and those with limited resources. However, there are reports of doses costing as little as 50 pesos (US$2.7) – or promotional packages of three doses for 150 pesos (US$8) – in cities in northern Mexico, such as Parral and Chihuahua. On the other hand, in the state of Durango, health authorities report a price of 200 pesos per dose (US$11.00), the highest retail price reported by local media.
Lightbulbs are reportedly often stolen from outside homes for use as makeshift pipes for consuming crystal meth. This increasingly prevalent phenomenon serves as an anecdotal indicator of the extent of localized crystal meth use. The shape of a lightbulb vaporizes the substance and resembles pipes specifically designed for smoking meth.
Meanwhile, the Bajío-based organization Barbies Testeadoras, a harm reduction project that has been testing substances with colorimetric chemical reagents since 2023, reports that only 4 out of 10 samples matched user expectations. Of the 108 samples they tested, 25% were adulterated, and half of all doses of 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (more commonly known as MDMA) were adulterated with methamphetamine.
FIGURE 14 Reported drug seizures by the Mexican Army, 1990–June 2024, by quantity.
Source: Adapted from Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, request for information INAI 330026424002125
Figure 14 shows descriptive statistics for reported drug seizures by the Mexican Army between January 1990 and June 2024. The data shows that the mean is dramatically higher than the median, which signals that the data is dominated by a handful of massive outlier seizures. To illustrate, seized quantities of three drugs are as follows:
- Cocaine: the median is just 0.04 kg (a few grams), while the mean is 25.26 kg. This suggests most seized quantities are very small (probably personal-use amounts or small packages), while a few large shipments (the maximum was 11 798.50 kg) account for most of the volume.
- Methamphetamine: this follows the same pattern – median 0.07 kg vs. mean 46.74 kg, and a maximum of 15 370 kg.
- Marijuana: median 6.81 kg vs. mean 372.74 kg. Here, even the typical seizure is modest, but the maximum (135 952.76 kg) is enormous.
This tells us that counting seizure events as opposed to volume produces different stories: large numbers of operations for cocaine, marijuana and methamphetamine net small amounts, but a smaller number of large seizures drive the aggregate totals.
The data for fentanyl pills, however, presents a contrasting picture to other substances. A ‘typical’ fentanyl pill seizure (the median) involves about 5 400 pills, which suggests a trafficking operation rather than personal use amounts. The average is skewed upwards by a small number of large seizures, including the maximum seizure of approximately 2.3 million pills. Seizures of fentanyl powder are even more consistent with mid-scale operations, where the median is 10.3 kilograms, which is not very different from the average of 27 kilograms.
Mexico’s mostly reactive approach towards drug policy, and in particular fentanyl, has resulted in flawed approaches that favour outputs (i.e. volumes of drugs seized), as opposed to outcomes – health policies aligned with the needs of its population, in particular meth users. In the coming years, and in the context of rapidly changing synthetic drug markets, Mexico can build on over three decades of evidence to implement a proactive trilateral policy that contributes to addressing the challenges posed by synthetic opioids in the US, Canada and the US–Mexico border region while ensuring it allocates resources to people-centred evidence-based policies.
FIGURE 15 Drug seizures in Mexico by substance, 1990–2024.
Source: Adapted from Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, request for information INAI 330026424002125
Key finding 4
Thirty-four years of data show drug seizures have expanded in geographic scope, but there are disparities along the US–Mexico border, depending on the substance.
The data shows that drug seizures are spread across a wide geographic area in Mexico, although seven states account for half of all seizures (see the map). Sonora, Michoacán, Jalisco, Guerrero and Tamaulipas constitute the top five states for seizures, spanning the northern and Pacific coasts. Notably, 66% of seizures are carried out in Pacific states, reflecting historical production and trafficking patterns prior to the rise of synthetics.
However, seizures of fentanyl buck the overall trend, since they are markedly concentrated along the north-west border. Baja California (30%), Sonora (28%) and Sinaloa (15%) account for the vast majority of fentanyl seizures, and 83.8% of fentanyl is seized in northern states. Historically, the Mexican army has concentrated enforcement operations against heroin and methamphetamine along or close to the US–Mexico border, with a particular focus on the cities of Tijuana, Nogales and Ciudad Juárez. Enforcement targeting cannabis and cocaine is more widely distributed.
Figure 16 shows the annual trend for seizures by drug type; Figure 17 shows geographic distribution over 10-year periods.
FIGURE 16 Geographic distribution of drug seizures by decade and substance.
Source: Adapted from Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, request for information INAI 330026424002125
The distribution of methamphetamine seizures is especially relevant for understanding Mexico’s increasing involvement in the production of synthetic drugs, including opioids. Data for laboratory seizures shows 97.5% of such seizures took place in Mexico’s Pacific states of Sinaloa, Michoacán and Jalisco. Meanwhile, Durango, although not a coastal state, has also played a major role in drug production linked to Sinaloa criminal organizations. The apparent orientation of enforcement operations towards Pacific states is consistent with the large volume of meth seizures that take place in San Diego, California (the latter is also one of the main ports of entry for unregulated fentanyl into the US).
Methamphetamine laboratories constitute the majority of seized clandestine drug laboratories, reaching a new annual high of 945 labs in 2023. Seizures of heroin labs peaked in 2007, while seizures of cocaine labs reached a new annual high in 2023. Geographically, Sinaloa has the dubious distinction of being home to the highest number of seized labs (2 448), mostly meth production labs. At the municipal level, the epicentre is Culiacán in Sinaloa, were 1 361 labs have been seized. In March 2025, authorities announced that a clandestine laboratory in the mountains of Zacatecas, in central Mexico, had been seized, preventing the production of more than 27 tons of methamphetamine (approximately 700 million doses). However, the supply of methamphetamine appeared to remain stable, since there was no reported increase in the cost per dose following this substantial seizure event.
FIGURE 17 Laboratory seizures over 10-year periods.
Source: Adapted from data from the Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, request for information INAI 330026424002125
Key finding 4
Thirty-four years of data show drug seizures have expanded in geographic scope, but there are disparities along the US–Mexico border, depending on the substance.
The data shows that drug seizures are spread across a wide geographic area in Mexico, although seven states account for half of all seizures (see the map). Sonora, Michoacán, Jalisco, Guerrero and Tamaulipas constitute the top five states for seizures, spanning the northern and Pacific coasts. Notably, 66% of seizures are carried out in Pacific states, reflecting historical production and trafficking patterns prior to the rise of synthetics.
However, seizures of fentanyl buck the overall trend, since they are markedly concentrated along the north-west border. Baja California (30%), Sonora (28%) and Sinaloa (15%) account for the vast majority of fentanyl seizures, and 83.8% of fentanyl is seized in northern states. Historically, the Mexican army has concentrated enforcement operations against heroin and methamphetamine along or close to the US–Mexico border, with a particular focus on the cities of Tijuana, Nogales and Ciudad Juárez. Enforcement targeting cannabis and cocaine is more widely distributed.
Figure 16 shows the annual trend for seizures by drug type; Figure 17 shows geographic distribution over 10-year periods.
FIGURE 16 Geographic distribution of drug seizures by decade and substance.
Source: Adapted from Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, request for information INAI 330026424002125
The distribution of methamphetamine seizures is especially relevant for understanding Mexico’s increasing involvement in the production of synthetic drugs, including opioids. Data for laboratory seizures shows 97.5% of such seizures took place in Mexico’s Pacific states of Sinaloa, Michoacán and Jalisco. Meanwhile, Durango, although not a coastal state, has also played a major role in drug production linked to Sinaloa criminal organizations. The apparent orientation of enforcement operations towards Pacific states is consistent with the large volume of meth seizures that take place in San Diego, California (the latter is also one of the main ports of entry for unregulated fentanyl into the US).
Methamphetamine laboratories constitute the majority of seized clandestine drug laboratories, reaching a new annual high of 945 labs in 2023. Seizures of heroin labs peaked in 2007, while seizures of cocaine labs reached a new annual high in 2023. Geographically, Sinaloa has the dubious distinction of being home to the highest number of seized labs (2 448), mostly meth production labs. At the municipal level, the epicentre is Culiacán in Sinaloa, were 1 361 labs have been seized. In March 2025, authorities announced that a clandestine laboratory in the mountains of Zacatecas, in central Mexico, had been seized, preventing the production of more than 27 tons of methamphetamine (approximately 700 million doses). However, the supply of methamphetamine appeared to remain stable, since there was no reported increase in the cost per dose following this substantial seizure event.
FIGURE 17 Laboratory seizures over 10-year periods.
Source: Adapted from data from the Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, request for information INAI 330026424002125
Key finding 5
The franchise model used by Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación severely limits the impacts of seizing clandestine labs.
The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) has franchised its brand, by allowing local groups to use its name. This allows the main criminal enterprise to use local gangs’ territories for trafficking and, in turn, controls the growth of these local criminal groups.
Territorial control is in the hands of local groups, who claim that the trafficking is operated by the CJNG. This business model seeks to avoid conflicts over territorial control and allows smaller groups to remain relevant and survive, but it largely benefits the cartel.
To understand the context, we must go back ten years, to when the Knights Templar – the cartel that controlled Michoacán and systematized extortion in the region – disappeared. After its demise, dozens of small criminal cells occupied limited territorial areas, specific municipalities, or even towns and cities. In recent years, some of these groups began appearing in videos with high-powered weapons, adopting the name CJNG.
This does not signify the incorporation of these cells into the cartel: rather, it demonstrates the Jalisco cartel's expansion model, which franchised its name in exchange for fees and percentages of the illicit economic activities carried out by these local groups in their areas of control, and, in turn, granted CJNG’s freedom of movement throughout the territory.
This has important implications for drug policy targeting CJNG as a ‘cohesive’ group. The growth and geographic spread of the franchise model limits the impact of seizing clandestine labs. The removal of one lab does not materially affect CJNG and does little to reduce supply. The impact is marginal at best.
Key finding 6
Criminal groups sustain themselves through forced recruitment of young people.
The rapid growth and spread of criminal groups throughout Mexico are sustained by forced recruitment of young people, who are subjected to inhumane training and torture. In 2021, an estimated 4 million children and adolescents between the ages of five and 17 were working in some capacity for criminal groups.
The profile of recruits is specific: skilled young men who are forced to work on the lowest rung of the criminal ladder. They are often lured in through fake job offers, including attractive vacancies advertised on TikTok, Facebook, Instagram. Sometimes, they are recruited at clandestine rehabilitation centres (commonly known as anexos in Mexico). Others are abducted during their commute, sometimes en masse and in collusion with municipal or state police. The cartel is suspected of hiring recruiters, paying them around 1 000 pesos per person.
Once forced recruits fall into the hands of the CJNG, there is no escape. They are threatened with death and taken to ‘training’ and torture centres known as ‘escuelitas’ (little schools). In March 2025, the Guerreros Buscadores de Jalisco (a collective formed by relatives of the disappeared) reported the discovery of such a site at Rancho Izaguirre – in Teuchitlán municipality, 60 kilometres from Guadalajara, where 1 800 personal items were found, including 435 articles of clothing, 154 pairs of shoes and 18 suitcases. Rancho Izaguirre had already been investigated six months earlier, in September 2024, when authorities rescued two kidnapped individuals, arrested 10 people and found skeletal remains, as well as other criminal evidence. Families complain that the site was not secured.
The forced recruits are moved repeatedly between training camps, ranging from locations like Rancho Izaguirre to mountain camps. Between 2011 and 2025, at least 12 training camps and 17 other camps were identified, distributed across 21 municipalities in Jalisco, Aguascalientes, Zacatecas and Michoacán; most of them were concentrated in the Valles region of Jalisco.
Upon ‘graduating’ from these training camps, survivors are placed on the cartel's payroll, when they begin working as lookouts, in exchange for meagre salaries that range from 2 500 to 3 000 pesos per week (US$138.00 to US$165.00). The lives of these young enforcers are highly expendable; they must fight to survive and climb the ranks of CJNG's armed wing.
Criminal groups also use children and adolescents to sustain their networks. Minors serve sentences in short-term detention programmes without any follow-up upon release, let alone any guarantee of adequate social reintegration.
North American Dispatch
Finding some common ground
North America is experiencing challenges with trilateral coordination on security and drug policy. However, despite tense political rhetoric, Canada, the US and Mexico have continued to work together in at least one forum, the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), which held its 69th session in March 2026.
Ambassador José Antonio Zabalgoitia Trejo, Mexico’s Permanent Representative in Vienna, at the CND’s 69th session, where a new Expert Panel was announced to support the 2029 global drug policy review. Photo: UNODC, via Facebook.
During the session, Mexico presented a resolution to improve tracking of specialized equipment and controlled materials to prevent their use in synthetic drug production. The resolution was adopted, with only India voting against it. It brings to the foreground discussions about equipment that have often been overlooked, due in part to an extensive focus on chemical precursors. The 70th session of the CND in March 2027 should provide insights into whether countries beyond North America have made progress in incorporating the resolution into their domestic policies.
Will Ryan Wedding’s arrest provide intelligence on drug supply chains?
A FBI Ten Most Wanted Fugitive poster for Ryan Wedding is displayed at the US Justice Department. Wedding’s case could provide insight into how drug trafficking networks operate across Canada, Mexico and the United States. Photo: Andrew Harnik/Getty Images
On January 2026, Mexico, the US and Canada announced that Ryan Wedding, a former Canadian Olympic snowboarder and a fugitive of US and Canadian law, had been taken into custody in Mexico and transferred to the US. Wedding’s rise to notoriety is linked to cocaine trafficking, and his arrest and subsequent criminal proceedings in the US and Canada could provide valuable information on how transnational actors operate across the region and insight into where enhanced cooperation among Canada, Mexico, and the US could be beneficial. In particular, the case may shed light on which tasks within the supply chain operation were managed by members of the Sinaloa criminal organization and which were subcontracted to people willing to act illicitly but without formal association with organized crime. And it may reveal which agencies in the three jurisdictions were primarily targeted for bribes to enable criminal activities and at which points was cash preferred over virtual currencies.
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In the next issue |
North American Dispatch
Finding some common ground
North America is experiencing challenges with trilateral coordination on security and drug policy. However, despite tense political rhetoric, Canada, the US and Mexico have continued to work together in at least one forum, the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), which held its 69th session in March 2026.
José Antonio Zabalgoitia Trejo, Mexico’s Permanent Representative in Vienna, at the CND’s 69th session, where a new Expert Panel was announced to support the 2029 global drug policy review. Photo: UNODC, via Facebook.
During the session, Mexico presented a resolution to improve tracking of specialized equipment and controlled materials to prevent their use in synthetic drug production. The resolution was adopted, with only India voting against it. It brings to the foreground discussions about equipment that have often been overlooked, due in part to an extensive focus on chemical precursors. The 70th session of the CND in March 2027 should provide insights into whether countries beyond North America have made progress in incorporating the resolution into their domestic policies.
Will Ryan Wedding’s arrest provide intelligence on drug supply chains?
A FBI Ten Most Wanted Fugitive poster for Ryan Wedding is displayed at the US Justice Department. Wedding’s case could provide insight into how drug trafficking networks operate across Canada, Mexico and the United States. Photo: Andrew Harnik/Getty Images
On January 2026, Mexico, the US and Canada announced that Ryan Wedding, a former Canadian Olympic snowboarder and a fugitive of US and Canadian law, had been taken into custody in Mexico and transferred to the US. Wedding’s rise to notoriety is linked to cocaine trafficking, and his arrest and subsequent criminal proceedings in the US and Canada could provide valuable information on how transnational actors operate across the region and insight into where enhanced cooperation among Canada, Mexico, and the US could be beneficial. In particular, the case may shed light on which tasks within the supply chain operation were managed by members of the Sinaloa criminal organization and which were subcontracted to people willing to act illicitly but without formal association with organized crime. And it may reveal which agencies in the three jurisdictions were primarily targeted for bribes to enable criminal activities and at which points was cash preferred over virtual currencies.
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In the next issue |
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to the people who use drugs in Mexico, Canada and the United States, whose substance donations for analysis to drug checking services make our research possible. We thank Tuesday Reitano for her thoughtful review and valuable suggestions for strengthening the monitor’s analysis. We are grateful to the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)’s Publications and Communications team for their work in making a highly technical subject accessible to a broader audience in both English and Spanish, and for the design concept, which help us push the boundaries of drug policy evidence.
About the authors
Cecilia Farfán Méndez is head of the North American Observatory at the GI-TOC. Dr Farfán is an expert on Mexican organized crime, US–Mexico security cooperation and gender mainstreaming. She is a non-resident senior fellow of the Mexico programme at the Inter-American Dialogue, and holds affiliations with the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at UC San Diego and the Centre for Security, Intelligence and Governance Studies at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México.
Samantha Pérez Dávila is a researcher specializing in drug policy, illicit markets, and organized crime and violence in Latin America. She has a PhD in policy analysis from the RAND School of Public Policy. She is a research fellow at the Niskanen Center and a monitoring and evaluation consultant for development programmes in Latin America and the Caribbean. She previously worked at the RAND Corporation and as executive coordinator of the drug policy programme at CIDE in Mexico.
Marcos Vizcarra is a journalist specializing in human rights and co-founder of Hasta Encontrarles, a project dedicated to documenting and investigating enforced disappearances in Sinaloa. He has been part of Revista ESPEJO since 2020, where he currently serves as deputy editorial director, and he contributes to El País México as its Sinaloa correspondent.
Marcela del Muro is an investigative journalist and coordinator of the Narrativas Dignas project. Her work focuses on human rights and gender-based violence. In 2021, she was a fellow of the National Geographic Society’s Emergency Fund for Journalists. Since 2023, she has been a partner of the Resilience Fund of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC).
Jason Eligh is a senior expert at the GI-TOC. He is an illicit drug market and policy analyst whose work focuses on understanding the contexts and characteristics influencing the development, growth and structural resilience of drug trade environments, particularly as these factors relate to sustaining harm.
About the North American Observatory
The North American Observatory monitors and analyzes criminal markets and changes in the operations of transnational organized crime groups in Mexico, the United States, and Canada, producing rigorous and timely research to inform public policy. It also promotes strategic exchange among authorities, academia, journalists, organized civil society, and other key actors, and strengthens capacities through spaces for dialogue and advocacy on issues such as the production and trafficking of unregulated fentanyl, synthetic drugs, and arms trafficking, incorporating a comprehensive gender perspective. The Observatory works in partnership with institutions such as the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy at the University of Toronto and the Center for Security, Intelligence and Governance Studies at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México.. Read more.
About the GI-TOC
The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime is a network of professionals working on the front lines of the fight against the illicit economy and criminal actors. Through a network of global civil society observatories on the illicit economy, we monitor evolving trends and work to build the evidence basis for policy action, disseminate the expertise of our Network, and catalyze multisectoral and holistic responses across a range of crime types. With the Global Initiative's Resilience Fund, we support community activists and local non-governmental organizations working in areas where crime governance critically undermines people's safety, security and life chances.
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